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CO-OPERATION IN THE CLASSROOM¹

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We have all been repeatedly told that great changes have taken place in methods of teaching, within the memory of people now living. I can bear first-hand witness to the truth of this.

In the study of Latin in my school, Exeter, we of my day spent the first third of the year in committing the coarse print, and much of the fine print, of Andrews and Stoddard's *Latin Grammar* to memory. When called upon in the classroom, we rose and repeated from the grammar verbatim. We memorized some of the examples given to illustrate the rules. But we did not read any Latin ourselves. In the second and third terms we read, beginning with a special reading-book.

While we were memorizing the grammar, the recitations involved very little activity on the teacher's part. All he had to say was something like, "Brown, begin." "Sufficient." "Hale, go on." It was a colossal operation, but it was distinctly one-sided.

When we came to reading, the procedure was as nearly similar as possible. We had learned the forms and the rules, and were supposed to be able, with the assistance of the vocabulary, to translate without any other help. If a mistake was made, the teacher would say, "Wrong," and hands would go up. He would call upon someone, who would perhaps give the right translation. If this boy failed, he would call upon another, and so on. Having got the right translation, the teacher would say, "Give the rule" for so and so, an ablative, for instance, or a subjunctive. If the answer was wrong, the teacher would say so, and hands would be raised, and one student after another would be called upon until the right rule was recited. The teacher gave no explanation. His aim was solely to make the student work. He succeeded

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beyond a doubt. We did, unquestionably, become very hardy little scholars.

But no school could carry through such a method today. If any tried, the students would rebel, or leave the school. The modern pupil does not expect much hardship, and will not submit to it. The real burden has thus fallen mainly upon the teacher. His side is as disproportionate today as that of the pupil used to be.

The old method was not a good one. We have better ways now. The poorest of our beginner's books in common use is superior to the best of that day. But, all the same, the student's part in the operations of the classroom, once too heavy, is now too slight. His interest is not active enough. How can we increase it? That is the problem which we are all constantly trying to solve for ourselves.

Many solutions have been printed. They mostly take the form of suggestions for activities in lines strictly outside the classroom, as the giving of Latin plays, or for the use of illustrative material, as photographs, slides, casts, and maps. I have nothing but respect for such suggestions. They are all helpful. But, to my mind, there is something still more helpful, and I want to discuss it with you.

It is difficult to win a young person's interest by telling him of the advantages to be had from the study of Latin, particularly if one of the things you tell him he is going to gain is mental discipline. That prospect is not inviting to him. Yet it is useless to hold up the contrary idea of a leisurely walk through paths of pleasure. He knows better. The only thing that is left is quietly and unostentatiously to address yourself to his love of activity. Love of activity is precisely the thing that characterizes human life. And never is it keener than in youth. It is upon this that the greater part of athletics is based, especially those forms in which the individual takes personal pleasure, without expecting in any special way to represent his school, as in tennis. Now the activity in question in our case is activity of the *mind*. It is observing and thinking. Get the student to do these two things, and he will enjoy the Latin classroom. But, again, the aim is to be reached, not by talking about its excellencies, but by

the actual doing of the two things. The student does them, under your thoughtful and carefully prepared guidance; and, doing them, he likes them.

Now I have more in mind than what is ordinarily conceived as the preparation and recitation of the daily lesson, as I shall presently show. But even on these lowest terms, there is a suggestion that I should like to make. The proper relation of the teacher to the pupil is not that of the inspector to the laborer, but of the coach to the football team. The coach trains his men for a contest in which, when it comes, they will have to stand alone. He drills them day after day in details of play, and in general strategy. He tries to make them familiar with every situation that can come up in the actual games which they will enter. He isn't really their taskmaster, no matter how hard he works them: he is their sympathetic helper. Presently comes the struggle for which he has been preparing them. And now, he must stand back and be silent. It is precisely so with our work. The teacher is the coach. The student is the player. Presently comes the day of the *game*: and the examination is that game. Here is the test of power, for which all the rest has been a preparation. No coaching now. The sympathy of the coach is all with the pupil, but he can give no help. He can only keep score.

This understanding of the real situation is more likely to be brought about if, in a school that has two or more sections in the same subject, the examination paper or papers are made by all the teachers concerned, and the actual rating is done by all, each teacher taking a part of the examination, for which he marks *all* the papers. Not only are the chances of unfairness thus reduced to a minimum, but the teacher can more effectively make his students see that his relation to them is really that of the coach to the athlete under training.

One other suggestion should be made at this point. The idea to be held up to the student from the beginning is that he is aiming at the power to read Latin. Every sentence that he reads is meant to help him toward that power. Then the actual question at the examination should not be, How well does the student remember how a given sentence picked out for the examination was trans-

lated when the class had the lesson containing it? but rather, How well can the student understand a sentence which he has never seen before, but which does not go outside of the constructions and vocabulary and general subject-matter with which he has been making himself familiar? In other words, the reading-matter in the examination should be at sight. And there should be frequent briefer exercises of the same kind, as a preparation, the sentences being put upon the board by the teacher, or read aloud by him.

I am speaking now of the work of the first year, in which the text read is not likely to have any special literary value of its own. But I should always have at least half the reading-matter at sight in any examination in any year, in school or college.

What I mean by my rather shadowy title, "Co-operation in the Classroom," is now, I hope, becoming clear. The conception is to be held up that, like coach and team, the teacher and pupil, in their daily lessons preceding the grand game, are working together toward a common aim, a winning score, in the attainment of which the one is just as much interested as the other.

But I have much more in mind than this. I would have the teacher stimulate in the student, not merely the power of accepting and applying what he learns from his books—the notes, say, and the grammar—but of judging for himself on what bases the statements rest or whether, indeed, they rest on any bases—whether, in short, they are sound. But of course you cannot stimulate this power unless you yourself have it and exercise it. If you believe that the printed word is a holy bible, why, you must take the intellectual consequences, and your pupils must suffer for your sins as well as for their own. But I can't see how you can possibly hold such a view. In the first place, the men and women who make your grammars and your notes and your composition books are mortals, just like you and me, and, outside of Latin, certainly not infallible. What are the chances of their being infallible inside? In the second place, you have only to look through a few grammars to see that they differ. If they differ, they can't all be right. Or, still better, you have only to look through a number of texts to see that, every little while, differing explanations are given for the same fact.

You will even find the same man changing his opinion in different editions of the same book. Obviously, people who make books may go wrong, and do go wrong. *You*, then, should hold your judgment free, acknowledging that you may go wrong like another, and acknowledging, too, that there are many things which you have not thought out, and which, in consequence, you don't know. I have to make the statement from time to time myself, and I never feel better satisfied with my teaching than when I bring a class to the point of intellectual energy and independence at which someone asks me a question which I cannot answer, and which requires me to beg time for consideration. There are in fact many things which have not yet been carefully thought out, so far as printed material shows, by anybody, and which nobody can rightly set forth at a moment's notice. And, finally, there are occasionally questions to which I doubt if anyone can ever present a sure answer.

But, on the other hand, there are a great many points of difference where a sure solution, positive or negative, is open to anyone. The solution comes through *observation* and *thought*. It is upon these processes, in fact, that the whole body of doctrine covered by our grammars or equivalent parts of other books ultimately rest, so far as it is not merely copied. The grammarian, to be sure, takes a great many authors into consideration in forming his conclusions. *You* have, generally speaking, only the texts of three authors before you, Caesar, Cicero, and Virgil, and these in very moderate quantities. But it is surprising, if you begin to observe and think, how much these limited texts will show you. And, please mark—for here is the pith of my whole matter—these texts lie before your student just as they lie before you, and nearly every student in your class is capable, with a little guidance, of seeing, just as clearly as you see, what evidence they present. And when he finds that he can really do this, it lifts him at once to a higher conception of the meaning of his work. He is beginning now to be a *thinker*, an *investigator*. And his interest in the work he is doing with you will grow prodigiously.

Let us see a few specific illustrations. We will start with a case-construction.

It is generally understood, nowadays, that the Latin ablative is made up of a mixture of three cases which were originally independent. They may conveniently be called a *from*-case, a *with*-case, and an *in*-case. The modern grammars generally divide the various constructions of the ablative under these three heads. Thus they put source under the *from*-ablative, means under the *with*-ablative, time at or within which under the *in*-ablative. This method of treatment unquestionably makes for the good of the student. Through understanding better, he remembers with less effort, and recognizes his author's meanings with greater certainty as he reads. All is well, if only the grammarian has really thought out his problems.

Now for an illustration of what the student can do. Early in the *Gallic War* he meets the expression *moribus suis*, "according to their customs." If, now, he is using the Allen and Greenough *Grammar*, the reference in his Caesar text will tell him that the construction is a variety of the ablative of specification; if the Harkness *Grammar*, that it is a variety of the ablative of cause; if the Bennett or the Gildersleeve *Grammar*, that it is a variety of the ablative of manner. Here are three absolutely contradictory explanations. Such a state of things certainly ought to show the intelligent teacher that the grammars are not impeccable. But the student, of course, will not have these contradictions set before him, since he is using only one grammar. Let us address ourselves to his case. Supposing the grammar is Bennett's. The student, looking up the reference, reads the following: "A special variety of the ablative of manner denotes that in accordance with which or in pursuance of which anything is or is done. It is generally used without a preposition." Going back to the preceding section, on manner, he reads, "The ablative with *cum* is used to denote manner; as *cum gravitate loquitur*, 'he speaks with dignity.' The preposition may be omitted when the ablative is modified by an adjective, as, *magna gravitate loquitur*, 'he speaks with great dignity.' "

Now the student can easily see that the phrase *moribus suis*, in the passage in question, *must* mean "*in accordance with* their customs." There is no question then of interpretation, but only

one of classification. He is told to associate the construction with that of manner. He is also told that, in the construction of manner, *cum* is used, or may be used, but that this special variety, represented by *moribus suis*, is generally used *without* a preposition. Suppose you inquire, now, what preposition he would expect to find, if one did occur. He will of course answer, *cum*. Then you can ask him to bear this test in mind, until the time when he meets an instance in which a preposition makes its appearance.

Three pages later, he finds *more et exemplo populi Romani*, "in accordance with the custom and precedent of the Roman people." You point out to him that he now knows one more word, *exemplo*, of the accordance group, and ask him if he remembers what the general problem is which the class is to solve, by its own observation. He will probably not yet have forgotten. Someone, at any rate, is sure to remember. Now ask the class to turn to ii. 19, and *yourself* translate: "For, because he was approaching the enemy, Caesar, according to his custom, was keeping six legions ready for battle as they marched," *Nam, quod hostibus adpropinquabat, consuetudine sua Caesar sex legiones expeditas ducebat*. Ask what they especially notice. Someone is sure to say that *consuetudine sua* is another phrase of the same group. Then ask the class to turn to i. 52, and translate to them: "but the Germans at once formed a phalanx according to their custom, and in this formation received the attack of the Roman swords," *at Germani celeriter ex consuetudine phalange facta impetus gladiatorum exceperunt*. Ask what the students notice here. A good many hands will go up. They notice that here at last, in the example *ex consuetudine*, they have a preposition, and that this preposition is not *cum*, but *ex*. To which branch of the ablative, you will ask, must you then assign the ablative of accordance? They will answer, the *from*-branch, of course!

Thus far, they would have no difficulty. And they have already tried their wings, and found that they can fly. The rest of the way, you must help them. The construction probably means something like "acting from his habit." That is, the general habit is that from which the action proceeds in the particular instance.

But supposing you are teaching Virgil, not Caesar. If you are alert, you will notice that Virgil, the lover of Rome's traditions, is particularly fond of the words *more* and *moribus* in the same sense of "in accordance with custom." But you will also notice that, while Caesar and Cicero use no preposition with these particular words, Virgil, with a poet's love of variety of expression, uses a preposition *more than half the time*, and that this preposition is always either *de*, as in i. 318, or *ex*, as in v. 244. A few questions, then, which you can put to the members of your Virgil class, will enable them to set the *moribus suis* construction in its right place in their minds.

Or supposing, again, that you are teaching Cicero. You are reading in the *Orations against Catiline*, i. 2, and come to this passage: *quo ex senatus consulto convenit*, etc., "in accordance with which decree of the senate." If, as I said before, you are alert, you will point out to your students that they have here the same idea of accordance, and you will ask what light the preposition, which is regular in this phrase and in many others, throws upon the phrases of accordance that do not have a preposition.

See all this wealth of opportunity for interesting observation and thinking afforded by high-school Latin! How much do teachers employ it with their pupils? Alas! how much do makers of grammars and textbooks employ it with themselves?

Next for examples from the moods. You must permit me to go a little slowly here. It will clarify the discussion which is to follow if I first lay down a form of statement which seems to me very helpful in teaching, although your students will be able to do what I have in mind if they have never heard it. The form of statement is this: Latin subjunctive constructions may be divided into two great families. In one, the mood does not correspond to a fact (thus in exhortation, wish, purpose, etc.). In the other, it does correspond to a fact. If the contents of a clause of this second family were put in an *independent* sentence in Latin, that sentence would be in the indicative. There are just three kinds of clauses in this second family—consecutive clauses, indirect clauses, and attracted clauses. To state the whole matter briefly, there are two families of subjunctive constructions in Latin, non-

fact constructions and fact-constructions; and the fact-constructions are either consecutive, or indirect, or attracted. Or we might say that a clause which, if independent, would be in the indicative, becomes subjunctive if it is consecutive, or indirect, or attracted.

Now for a little observation and thinking with the student. Early in Caesar he learns something about the subjunctive clause of characteristic, as it is commonly called, or, as I like better to call it, the *descriptive*, clause—a name which the Committee on Grammatical Nomenclature has adopted. The student learns that it is in origin a consecutive clause, and that this is why it is in the subjunctive. The first example is in i. 6. You recall the passage: “there were in all two ways by which they could go out,” *erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus exire possent*. If put in an independent sentence, this would be, “they could go out by two ways,” *itineribus duobus exire poterant* (indicative). Compare for example, “these men could not be persuaded,” *his persuaderi non poterat*, ii. 10.

Caesar goes on: “one through the country of the Sequani, narrow and difficult, where wagons could barely be drawn one at a time.” Now ask, “What does this clause correspond to in the rest of the sentence?” The answer will be, *angustum et difficile*, “narrow and difficult.” Then this clause is in effect an adjective. What kind of adjectives are *angustum* and *difficile*? The answer will be, “descriptive.” Then if the clause is like a descriptive adjective, what kind of a clause is it? The answer will be, “a descriptive clause.” That is quite right. Now we have just had a descriptive clause above—*quibus possent*. That expressed a fact. Does *ducerentur* express a fact? “No.” What does it express? “A possibility.” Then, since fact and possibility are not the same, it will not answer merely to call these two clauses descriptive clauses, showing no difference in the name. We must put the word “fact” somehow into the name of one, and “possibility” into the name of the other. How can we do it? Someone, I think, will suggest, “Call one a descriptive clause of fact, and the other a descriptive clause of possibility.” And that is obviously exact.

To leave our class a moment, I have always felt it to be unfortunate that the first place where the subjunctive descriptive clause occurs—*quibus itineribus exire possent*—should be complicated for the young student by the use of the auxiliary *possem*, because that in itself expresses possibility. We have to translate both *exire possent* and *ducerentur* by “could.” But since Caesar has put this difficulty before us, let us turn it to our advantage by showing the student that in the first example it is the meaning of the auxiliary verb that expresses possibility, while in the second example it is the mood alone. And we can reinforce this lesson when, presently, we encounter *qua ire non poterant*, i. 9.

We come back now from our conference as teachers about our regrets that Caesar didn't know he was writing a Latin text, and resume our work with our class.

We have reached i. 14, let us say, in our reading. Caesar writes: “The Roman people were taken in, because they were not conscious of having done anything on account of which they should feel anxiety [*quare timeret*], and they didn't think they ought to feel anxiety [*timendum*] without any reason.” There is another example of the same kind in chap. 19: “Caesar thought there was reason enough why he should punish him,” *satis esse causae, quare in eum animadverteret*. The two clauses *quare timeret* and *quare animadverteret* are obviously in the same construction. The Caesar texts not under my disturbing influence give three different explanations—purpose, indirect question, and characteristic. Now one can easily enough see that the meaning in the first example cannot be one of purpose. Caesar cannot have meant “the Roman people had done nothing *with the intention* of feeling anxiety.” Neither can the clause be an indirect question. Even if one thinks that *causae* in the second example can ask a question, it is clear that, in the other, *neque commissum esse*, “nothing had been done,” cannot ask a question. The verbs that ask questions are *quaero*, *rogo*, and the like, not verbs like *committo*. And certainly *neque* cannot ask a question, nor could the word *nihil*, which it practically includes. You can guide any class to see that either of these explanations, whichever it happens to have in its notes, is impossible.

Now for the third explanation, "clause of characteristic," which the student will find if, for example, he is using the Allen and Greenough text. Ask the class what mood we have found that the clause of characteristic as we first met it corresponds to in the independent form. If they have forgotten, go back to the example *quibus itineribus exire possent*. It corresponds to an indicative—a statement of fact. Then ask whether *timeret* corresponds to a fact. The class will easily see that it does not. The very point is that the Roman people had *not* felt anxiety. Then the mood-feeling of the clause must be different from that of the type of characteristic clause which the student has learned. What is this mood-feeling? We have merely to *observe* what lies before us. Caesar has shown us unmistakably. The significant parts are balanced against each other. *Neque commissum*, "had done nothing," is balanced against *sine causa*, "without a reason" (i.e., "without having done anything"), and *quare timeret* is balanced against *timendum*. But we know perfectly well what the form *timendum* must here mean. It means "*ought* to fear." Then *quare timeret* must correspondingly mean "why it *ought* to fear." See how simple the whole thing is: "The Roman people had done nothing on account of which they ought to fear, and they didn't think they ought to fear *without* having done anything." The subjunctive then expresses the *ought* idea, i.e., *obligation* or *propriety*. The clause is, indeed, a descriptive one. But, again, we mustn't merely say "descriptive," where the meanings are so far apart. As we spoke before of the descriptive clause of fact, and of the descriptive clause of possibility, so now we must speak of the descriptive clause of obligation or propriety.

I have already implied that some of the texts, following my lead, explain this last clause as I do. Thus Kelsey gives the reference to "characteristic" for the other grammars, but adds "better Hale-Buck, 513, 2," which is the reference to the place where I treat the construction. But the essential point is that, though my predecessors had missed the mood-force, the student, with a little co-operation from his teacher, can be led to make it out from his own observation.

I have said that, besides the consecutive clause, there are two other kinds of clauses, of an essentially *indicative* nature, in which

the Romans wrote the subjunctive, namely, indirect clauses and attracted clauses. Doesn't this suggest that we ought to keep carefully on our guard against explaining examples as something else, when they are really merely, so to speak, indicatives put indirectly, or indicatives attracted by a subjunctive on which they depend?

Let us take an illustration. In the *Gallic War* ii. 27, Caesar writes, "upon their arrival, so great a change took place in the situation that our men, even those who had fallen exhausted by their wounds, renewed the battle." The Allen and Greenough notes, and many others, call *qui procubuissent*, "those who had fallen," a clause of characteristic. And they give the same explanation for *qui superessent*, "those who survived," in a passage which immediately succeeds, and which runs as follows: "but the enemy showed such courage that, when the front line had fallen, the next line stood upon their bodies, and when these were thrown down in heaps, those who survived threw their weapons against our men as from a hill." Now if you ask why Caesar wrote *qui procubuissent* and *qui superessent*, subjunctive, and not *qui procubuerant* and *qui supererant*, indicative, the student who has read the notes, and not thought, will say "subjunctive of characteristic." But I should be surprised if, provided your class has really been trained in thinking, someone didn't say that this clause was *not* descriptive, meaning, "such that they fell" and "such that they survived," but merely pointed out *who* were meant—"those who had fallen," "those who survived," or, in my terminology, now sanctioned by the Committee on Grammatical Nomenclature, were in their own nature *determinative* clauses, for which, unless there were some outside influence at work, the mood would be indicative. This is precisely what happened to me when I taught Caesar some years ago in our University High School in Chicago. But in any case, you can say, "Wait now and see if any evidence on the subject turns up later." It happens that in the very next lesson, unless it falls within the same one, this passage occurs: "by the agreement of all those who survived, they sent ambassadors to Caesar." The idea, "those who survived," is exactly the same in the two passages, *qui superessent* above and the one here; but in the *second one*, Caesar wrote *qui supererant*. Now some of your students are

sure to have noted this. They will then have seen that *qui superessent* is at any rate not a descriptive clause, and that *qui procubuissent*, which is like it, is likewise not descriptive. So far, so good, and thoroughly worth doing. If your students have got no farther, you will next say that, since the two clauses are identical in force, the reason in the case of the subjunctive must lie *outside the clause itself*, that is, in its surroundings. You will then ask them to look at the mood of the verb upon which the indicative clause depends, and the mood of the verb upon which the subjunctive clause depends. They will find that, for the indicative clause, the verb on which it depends is an indicative, and that for the subjunctive clause, it is a subjunctive. You will then have to explain to them (for this is one of the rarer constructions) that the verb in the subjunctive has drawn over the mood of the dependent clause to its own mood, that is, that *procubuissent* and *superessent* are due to attraction. But though the entire work has not been performed by your students, they will have done some real observing, under your general guidance, and will have learned something of the nature of syntactical evidence. And they will *enjoy* their own mental performance.

One more example under this general head. It occurs early in the *Gallic War*. In chap. 3, you read that "the Helvetians made up their mind to get together the things that had to do with the journey," *constituerunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinerent comparare*. Why did Caesar write *pertinerent*, subjunctive, and not *pertinebant*, indicative? The notes are pretty sure to tell you, and, though they used to be wrong, they are mostly right now. They say that the clause is indirect. I find, however, that the majority of the former teachers in my teachers' training course will still call *quae pertinerent* a descriptive clause. I tested the matter again yesterday in writing. Out of the thirteen who had not worked with me before, eight gave this wrong answer, and only three the right answer. Let us see now how the young reader of Caesar can be guided to see rightly for himself, or, if the note is already right, to see for himself that it *is* right. You point out to him, or the note does, that the clause *quae pertinerent* depends upon a verb of mental action, *constituerunt*, and that, accordingly, the mood *may*

be due to indirectness. "How now," you will ask the class, "can we make sure whether the clause is inherently subjunctive, or whether it is merely a clause of an indicative nature, presented indirectly, i.e., as a part of the thought of the subject of *constituerunt*?" Very likely the students will not be able, at this stage of their development, to see, and you will have to set them on the right way. When a physicist finds a phenomenon which may conceivably be due to either of two causes, he tries to devise an experiment by which one of these causes is ruled out. Our way is the same. What we must do is to see if there is somewhere a place where this same idea, "the things that have to do with" occurs, but where the idea of indirectness cannot be present. If you have Meusel's *Lexicon to Caesar*, where every instance of every word is given in its context, you will save yourself labor here and in corresponding problems. You will turn to *pertineo* and read until you come to an example. But even if you haven't this lexicon, you can find your proof by reading. An example has, in fact, already occurred. You will suggest then that the students go back to the beginning of the *Gallic War* and see if by chance they have already had such a case. Presently hands will go up. Only about nine lines down they have found *ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent*, "the things which have to do with weakening manly qualities." *Pertinent*, indicative, not *pertineant*, subjunctive! They will see the point now perfectly. The clause is merely a determinative clause, telling what class of things is meant, *those which*, etc. Then the *quae pertinerent* clause is not subjunctive in its own nature. The idea is in itself an indicative one; and the subjunctive mood is accordingly due to the *surroundings*, i.e., to the fact that the clause here appears as a part of what was in the minds of the subject of *constituerunt*, or, in grammatical terms, to indirectness. You can go on and point out other similar direct clauses which you have observed, such as the very exact parallel, *quae ad oppugnandum usui erant comparare coepit*, "began to get together the things which were necessary for a siege." But the essential point is that, in any case, you have got even these very young students to take part in real observation and real thinking.

And now for another application, of a much easier kind, in a different province.

Professor Greenough, now many years ago, read a paper on Latin word-order to a small club of classical philologists, of whom I was one. In this paper he set forth a new theory, to the effect that the order of the Latin sentence was determined by relative emphasis, the first word being the most emphatic, the second the next in emphasis, and so on upon a descending scale, down to the end. We did our best to persuade him that he was wrong, but unsuccessfully. He then published the paper, and introduced the doctrine into the next edition of the Allen and Greenough *Grammar*, and of the Allen and Greenough *Caesar*. He wrote, among other things, "The more important word is never placed last for emphasis. The apparent cases of this usage are cases where a word is added as an afterthought, either real or affected, and so has its position, not in the sentence to which it is appended, but, as it were, a new one." The doctrine still stands in both books, although they have been revised by such well-known workers as Kittredge and Howard of Harvard, and D'Ooge of Ypsilanti.

Now, if you are using either of these books, set your students to observing examples. On the first page of the *Gallic War* occurs the sentence, *horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae*, "of all these, the bravest are the Belgians." Ask the student which is the more important part of this sentence, the idea that there "were bravest," or the idea that these bravest were "the Belgians"? I don't think many students would fail to say the latter. Or let us turn the situation into modern terms, in a sentence of the same nature: "Of all the nations fighting in Europe today, the bravest is. . . ." Would anyone say that the least important word in this sentence is the one that is still to come? Or take the passage in chap. 10, *ab Ocelo, quod est oppidum citerioris provinciae extremum*, "from Ocelum, which is the last town of Hither Gaul." Would any student say that the last word, *extremum*, was the least important part, or an afterthought? And in *hi sunt extra provinciam trans Rhodanum primi*, "this people is the first outside of the province beyond the Rhone," would any student say the same of the last word, *primi*? If not, then the doctrine is wrong. But

again, let me insist: my point is not that this or that book is in error; my point is that the student can observe and think.

The subject of word-order, that is, of the order in which the ideas are presented to the reader, is of exceeding interest, and we are losing a vast amount of pleasure in our reading, besides depriving our students of a great field for observation on their own part, in being blind to it. I wish I could talk to you about it, and, since very little that is trustworthy has been published on the subject, try to make the way of procedure plain. But it would take another address to do this. I can only give the obvious caution, that, in case you try for yourselves, you must draw your conclusions from Roman Latin, and not from modern made-up Latin.

And now let me be sure that my main purpose in this address is clear. The co-operation of teacher and student in the classroom means activity on the part of both. You and he are fellow-workers, with one aim. I might have taken for my title, "The Pleasures of Thinking"; but that would not sufficiently hint at your side of the work. *You* are to do the guidance, leading him to observe and think. You cannot do this without observing and thinking yourself. But there are rewards for both of you. The man who said that nothing was so painful as a new idea was witty, but not truthful. You will find that, with help from you, your student not only *can* observe and think but that he will *like* to do these things, and that your very best hope of winning his interest in his work with you lies precisely in getting him to do them.

Let me then append, as a motto for the classroom, both for you and for him, this sentence from Plautus: *specta, tum scies*, "*look, and you will see.*"